

So that you may clearly appreciate the general situation, I would like to point out exactly where and in what condition the military units were at the time of which I am speaking. Two Army Inspections had been established on principle in Anatolia. Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice the regular soldiers at the front were disbanded. Deprived of their arms and ammunition, the Army consisted only of units having no fighting value.

The distribution of the troops under the second Army Inspection, with its headquarters at Konya, was as follows: The XIIth Army Corps, with its Staff at Konya, consisted of one division — the 41st — at Konya and another — the 23rd — at Afyonkarahisar. To this Army Corps was attached the 57th Division, stationed at Denizli, belonging to the XVIIth Army Corps, which had been captured at İzmir.

The XXth Corps and its Staff was stationed at Ankara — one of its divisions, the 24th, in Ankara itself and the other, the 11th, at Niğde.

The 1st Division stationed at İzmit, was attached to the XXVth Army Corps, which also included the 10th Caucasian Division.

The 61st and 56th Divisions were quartered in the district of Balıkesir and Bursa and formed the XIVth Army Corps, with headquarters at Bandırma and directly under the command of İstanbul. The late Yusuf İzzet Paşa commanded this Army Corps until the National Assembly was opened.

I was myself at the head of the third Inspection when I landed with my Staff at Samsun. I was to have had two Army Corps under my personal command. One of them, the IIIrd, had its base at Sivas and was commanded by Colonel Refet Bey, who came with me to Samsun.

One division of this Corps, the 5th Caucasian, was at Amasya; the other, the 15th, was at Samsun. The second Army Corps under my command was the XVth, stationed at Erzurum and commanded by Kâzım Karabekir Paşa. One of his division, the 9th, commanded by Ruhi Bey, was in garrison at Erzurum; the other, under the command of Lt. Colonel Halid Bey, was at Trabzon. After Halil Bey had been called to İstanbul, he abandoned his command and hid himself at Bayburt. Another man took command temporarily of the division. One of the two remaining divisions of the Army Corps, the 12th, was near Hasankale, on the eastern frontier, and the 11th was at Bayazıt.

The XIIth Army Corps consisted of two divisions stationed in the district of Diyarbakır and was independent, as it was directly under İstanbul. One of its divisions, the 2nd, was at Siirt, while the other, the 5th, was at Mardin.

These two Army Corps were directly under my command and I was also authorized to give orders to other troops lying within the district of my Inspection, in all the vilayets comprised within it and in the neighbouring provinces.

In virtue of the authority vested in me, I had the right to enter into communication and correspondence with the XXth Army Corps at Ankara, with its superior Army Inspection, as well as with the Army Corps at Diyarbakır and the heads of the Civil Administration in nearly the whole of Anadolu.

You might, perhaps, be inclined to ask why those who sent me to Anadolu with the idea of banishing me from İstanbul entrusted me with such wide powers. The answer is, that they did not know themselves what they were doing. They invented the pretext that it was necessary for me to go to Samsun to report on the spot on the unsettled condition of the district and to take the necessary measures to deal with it. I had pointed out that in order to do his I should be given special authority and special powers. There did not seem to be any objection to this. I discussed the question with men who were on the General Staff at that time and who to a certain extent guessed my intentions. These were the persons who conceived the idea of my taking up the position, and I dictated the order giving me full powers. Apparently Şakir Paşa, the Minister of War, after reading them, hesitated to sign them and his seal that was attached to the document was scarcely recognizable.

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Let us return to a closer examination of the facts, so that we may rapidly review them as a whole.

Morally and materially, the enemy Powers were openly attacking the Ottoman Empire and the country itself. They were determined to disintegrate and annihilate both. The Padişah-Caliph had one sole anxiety — namely, to save his own life and comfort. The members of the government had the same feeling. Without being aware of it, the nation had no longer any one to lead it, but lived in darkness and uncertainty, waiting to see what would happen. Those who began to understand clearly the terrors and extent of the catastrophe were seeking some means whereby to save the country, each guided by the circumstances that surrounded him and the sentiments that inspired him. The Army existed merely in name. The commanders and other officers were still suffering from the exhaustion resulting from the war. Their hearts were bleeding on account of the threatened dismemberment of